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ORDERED FIELD PROPERTY FOR ZERO-SUM STOCHASTIC
GAMES∗
K. AVRACHENKOV†, V. EJOV‡ , J. A. FILAR¶,‖, AND A. MOGHADDAM¶,∗∗
Abstract. We consider a finite state, finite action, zero-sum stochastic games with data defining
the game lying in the ordered field of algebraic numbers. In both the discounted and the limiting
average versions of these games we prove that the value vector also lies in the same field of algebraic
numbers. In a prescribed sense, our results settle a problem that has remained open since, at least,
1991.
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1. Introduction. Arguably, modern game theory was launched in 1928 by von
Neumann (see [19]). His seminal paper proved that a finite, zero-sum, two person
(matrix) game possesses a game-theoretic value and a pair of optimal strategies. Sub-
sequently, Weyl (see [20]) supplied a simpler proof and, in addition, showed that if
the entries of such a matrix game belong to an ordered field, then the value belongs
to the same ordered field.
Stochastic games were introduced in 1953 by Shapley (see [14]). Shapley’s for-
mulation was analogous to what are now called discounted stochastic games. In these
games the rewards at future stages are discounted by a factor β ∈ [0, 1). However,
in a remark, Shapley also observed that Weyl’s ordered field property does not hold
for stochastic games. In particular, when the data of these games lie in the field of
rational numbers, the value vector need not be in the same field.
The latter remark, stimulated a whole line of research attempting to characterize
special classes of stochastic games that possess the ordered field property. Indeed, at
least five, structured, classes of stochastic games have been identified and shown to
possess the ordered field property, over the field Q of rational numbers. These classes
include stochastic games of perfect information originally introduced by Gillette in
1957 [3], separable reward and state independent transition (SER-SIT) games [16],
[10], single-controller games [9], switching-controller games [2] and additive reward
and additive transition (ARAT) games [12]. However, a more comprehensive charac-
terization of the ordered field property proved to be challenging and was named as
one of the open problems in the topic in a 1991 survey paper [11].
In this paper we provide a rather complete answer to the above mentioned open
problem, in the sense that we, constructively, establish the ordered field property
over the ordered field F of real algebraic numbers. This is shown without any struc-
tural assumptions on the game and applies to both discounted and limiting average
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2 Ordered field property and stochastic games
stochastic games that will be introduced later on. Arguably, F is the most natural
ordered field to consider in view of the fact that the field of rational numbers Q was
too small. This is because F is a finite degree field extension of Q is also countable
and, in the sense of Rotman ([13], page 50), it is smallest field containing rationals.
Our analysis exploits Gro¨bner basis methods as well as results reported in Szczechla
et al. [17] and we also use similar notation to the latter paper.
We note that the asymptotic behavior of the value vector as β → 1 has been
studied by a number of authors. In an important, and related, contribution Bewley
and Kohlberg [1] viewed Shapley’s “optimality condition” as an elementary sentence in
formal logic over the closed ordered field of real Puiseux series. These authors invoke
a powerful theorem from mathematical logic, known as Tarski’s principle, to conclude
that in some neighborhood of β = 1, the value vector belongs to the field of real
Puiseux series. We also note that our approach has similarities to the semialgebraic
theory of stochastic games proposed in Milman [7] and continued by Neyman [8]. The
latter permits analysis of sets defined by both polynomial equations and inequalities
but it is not immediately clear how to apply Gro¨bner basis approach in that context.
2. Definitions and preliminaries of matrix games. Any m× n real matrix
A = (aij)
m,n
i,j=1 can be regarded as a two-person, zero-sum matrix game with aij
denoting the amount player II will pay player I if II chooses an action j ∈ 1, 2, · · · , n
and I chooses an action i ∈ 1, 2, · · · ,m. A mixed (or randomized) strategy for player
I(II) in such a game is an m(n)-component probability vector x(y) whose ith(jth)
entry xi(yj) denotes the probability that player I(II) will choose an action i(j). A
consequence of the celebrated “minimax theorem” for matrix games [19] is that there
always exists a strategy pair (x0, y0) satisfying:
(2.1) xTAy0 ≤ (x0)TAy0 ≤ (x0)TAy
for all mixed strategies x(y) of player I(II). The strategies (x0, y0) are then called
optimal strategies, and the real number val(A) := (x0)TAy0 is called the value of
the matrix game A. It is well known that if bij = kaij + c, for all i, j, k > 0, and
B = (bij)
m,n
i,j=1, then valB = kvalA + c. Hence, there is no loss of generality in
assuming that the value of a matrix game is either positive, or simply, not equal to
zero.
A matrix game A is called completely mixed if all of its optimal strategies are
strictly positive in every component. Extending earlier results of Kaplansky [4], Shap-
ley and Snow [15] demonstrated the following result.
Proposition 2.1. If A is a matrix game and valA 6= 0, then A has a square
invertible submatrix A¯, called a Shapley–Snow kernel, such that
(K1) valA¯ = valA = det(A¯)∑
ij A¯
ij =
(
1T [A¯−1]1
)−1
where A¯ij denotes the (i, j)th cofac-
tor of A¯.
(K2) There is a pair
(
x0, y0
)
of strategies for A¯ which is optimal for A¯ (after in-
serting zeroes) and satisfies
(
x0
)T
= (valA)1T [A¯−1] and y0 = (valA) [A¯−1]1.
Remark 2.2. If valA 6= 0, Lemma 1.2 of [17] shows that it is always possible to
find a Shapley-Snow kernel A¯ that is a completely mixed matrix game and, of course,
still satisfies (K1) − (K2), above. Following [17] we shall refer to such a kernel as
cmv-Shapley-Snow kernel, or simply cmv-kernel. Their usefulness stems from the fact
that the algebraic formula for their value valA¯ =
(
1T [A¯−1]1
)−1
is invariant under
small perturbations.
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3. Discounted stochastic games.
3.1. Definitions and preliminaries of stochastic games. A stochastic game
as formulated by Shapley [14] is played in stages. At each stage, the game is in one
of finitely many states, s = 1, 2, . . . , N , in which players I and II are obliged to
play a matrix game R(s) = (r(s, a, b))ms,nsa,b=1 , once. The “law of motion” is defined by
p(s′|s, a, b), where the event {s′|s, a, b} is the event that the game will enter state s′
at the next stage given that at the current stage the state of the game is s, and that
players I and II choose the ath row and the bth column of R(s), respectively.
In general, players’ strategies will depend on complete past histories. In this
paper, however, we shall only be concerned with stationary strategies. We may rep-
resent a typical stationary strategy µ for player I by a “composite” vector, µ =
(µ(1), µ(2), . . . , µ(N)), where each µ(s) is a probability distribution on {1, 2, . . . ,ms}.
Player II’s stationary strategies ν are similarly defined.
It should be clear that once we specify the initial state s and a strategy pair (µ, ν)
for players I and II, we implicitly define a probability distribution over all sequences
of states and actions which can occur during the game and consequently over all
sequences of payoffs to player I. In particular, if the random variable Rt denotes the
payoff to player I at stage t, then the expected value of Rt given s and (µ, ν)
(3.1) Eµνs(Rt) := E{Rt|µ, ν, s}
is well defined. The β-discounted stochastic game Γβ is then the game in which the
overall payoff, normalized by a factor of 1− β, resulting from the strategy pair (µ, ν)
and a starting state s is evaluated according to
vβ(µ, ν, s) :=
∞∑
t=1
βt−1(1− β)Eµνs(Rt),
where β ∈ (0, 1) is called the discount factor. The number vs(β) is called the value of
the game Γβ starting in state s if vs(β) = supµ infν vβ(µ, ν, s) = infν supµ vβ(µ, ν, s).
The vector v(β) = (v1(β), v2(β), . . . , vN (β)) is called the value vector. Furthermore,
the pair (µ0, ν0) is called an optimal strategy pair for players I and II if, for each
starting state s,
vs(β) = vβ(µ
0, ν0, s).
The existence of the value vector and of a pair of optimal stationary strategies was
proved in 1953 in Shapley’s seminal paper on the subject [14]. A key element in Shap-
ley’s proof was the construction of N auxiliary matrix games Rβ(s,u) that depend
on an arbitrary vector u = (u1, u2, . . . , uN) ∈ R
N according to
(3.2) Rβ(s,u) =
[
(1− β)r(s, a, b) + β
N∑
s′=1
p(s′|s, a, b)us′
]ms,ns
a,b=1
.
In view of the fact that the value of a matrix game always exists, it is possible to
define, for each β ∈ (0, 1), an operator Tβ : R
N −→ RN, the sth component of which
is given by
(3.3) [Tβ(u)]s := val[Rβ(s,u)].
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This operator is a contraction operator in the sup-norm with contraction constant
≤ β; see [14]. It therefore follows from Banach’s fixed-point theorem that there exists
a unique fixed point v(β) of Tβ ; that is,
(3.4) v(β) = Tβ(v(β)).
Also, any set of optimal strategy pairs for Rβ(s,v(β)) (s = 1, 2, . . . , N) can be shown
to form an optimal strategy pair for Γβ.
Assume vs(β) 6= 0 for all β and s. In view of Proposition 2.1 we know that for
each fixed β ∈ (0, 1) and each u close enough to v(β) there exist cmv-kernels R¯β(s,u)
such that the fixed-point equation above reduces to
(3.5) vs(β) =
det(R¯β(s,v(β)))∑
i
∑
j [R¯β(s,v(β))]
ij
for each s = 1, 2, . . . , N,
where [V ]ij denotes the (i, j)th cofactor of a matrix V .
If we now transform the above equations to
(3.6) vs(β)


∑
i
∑
j
[R¯β(s,v(β))]ij

− det(R¯β(s,v(β))) = 0, s = 1, 2, . . . , N,
then for each fixed combination of the locations of these kernels we can regard this
system as being a system of polynomials in the variables z0 := β, z1 := v1(β), z2 :=
v2(β), . . . , zN := vN (β) of the form
(3.7)


f1(z0, . . . , zN) = 0
...
fN(z0, . . . , zN) = 0.
Consider any fixed collection of non-empty subsets of actions Ks ⊆ {1, . . . ,ms}
and Ls ⊆ {1, . . . , ns} such that card Ks = card Ls for all s = 1, . . . , N . Thus we
have a finite sequence of sets κ = (K1, L1, . . . ,KN , LN). By restricting the players’
actions in each state s to Ks and Ls, we obtain a discounted stochastic game, Γβ,κ
with auxiliary Shapley games
(3.8) Rβ,κ(s,u) = [Rβ(s,u)ij ]i∈Ks,j∈Ls .
For fixed κ, let
(3.9) R¯β(s,u) = Rβ,κ(s,u) = [Rβ(s,u)ij ]i∈Ks,j∈Ls .
be the sth cmv-kernel associated with κ. Clearly the system of polynomials (3.7)
depends on κ but this dependence is suppressed in order to simplify already compli-
cated notation. However, it is important to note that K = {κ|defining cmv-kernels}
is finite. Hence, there are at most |K| systems of polynomials of the form (3.7) to
consider, where |K| denotes the cardinality of K.
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3.2. Discounted stochastic games over the ordered field of algebraic
numbers. Suppose now that all the data of the discounted stochastic game Γβ ,
namely, r(s, a, b), p(s′|s, a, b) (for all, s, s′, a, b) and β lie in the field F of real algebraic
numbers. From the outset, we wish to outline a very elegant - but non-constructive -
proof of the fact that entries of the value vector v(β) of Γβ lie in F that is based on
a deep result from the field of mathematical logic that is known as Tarski’s Principle
[18] which states that:
An elmentary sentence which is valid over one real closed field is valid over every
real closed field.
Now, Bewley and Kohlberg [1] showed that Shapley’s theorem captured in (3.4)
constitutes a valid elementary sentence over the reals. Since the field F is known to
be real closed, the result follows immediately.
We do not go into all details of the above argument because the main objective
of this study, for Γβ , is to explicitly exhibit the construction of decoupled, bivariate,
polynomials whose roots contain the entries of v(β) and to demonstrate the usefulness
of Gro¨bner basis techniques in the process. Furthermore, our approach lends itself to
extension to the limiting average stochastic games covered in the next section. Since
there is no analogue for Shapley’s theorem in that case, it is not clear whether Tarski’s
principle could be used there.
Returning to the main line of discussion, suppose now that the Shapley-Snow
kernels K have been fixed and chosen correctly in the sense that zs = vs(β); s =
1, 2, . . . , N satisfy both (3.5) and (3.6) for z0 = β. That is, (z0, z), with z = [z1, ..., zN ],
is among the real-valued roots of the system of coupled polynomial equations (3.7)
which we now re-write as


f1(z0, z) = 0
...
fN (z0, z) = 0.
(3.10)
The zero-set of (3.10) constitutes an algebraic variety, W , which can be difficult to
analyse. Fortunately, the Gro¨bner basis methods (e.g. see the excellent book of
Adams and Loustaunau [5]) enable us to, instead, examine a simpler variety Wd ⊃W
(of the same dimension as W ) in a neighbourhood of the solution of the stochastic
game that corresponds to the zero-set of suitably constructed decoupled polynomials

g1(z0, z1) = 0
...
gN (z0, zN) = 0,
(3.11)
where each gs(z0, zs) is a bivariate polynomial in only z0 and zs. That is, the zeroes
of (3.11) contain the zeroes of (3.10) and hence the solution of the stochastic game.
The above simplification follows from the next result which can also be seen as
a constructive extension of Lemmata 4.1 − 4.2 and Theorem 4.3 proved in Szczechla
et al. [17]. Interestingly, perhaps, the latter results exploit the fact that the con-
traction property of the Shapley operator Tβ ensures that the Jacobian of the map
corresponding to the fixed point equation is nonsingular.
Theorem 3.1. Consider a discounted stochastic game Γβ with all data lying in
the ordered field of algebraic numbers. There exist bivariate, decoupled, polynomials
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gs(z0, zs) in variables z0, zs, for s = 1, 2, . . . , N , whose zeroes define the variety Wd
containing the solution of the stochastic game, for each z0 = β ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore,
the corresponding zs = vs(β) is an algebraic number for each s = 1, 2, . . . , N .
Proof. Let Hβ := {(z0, z1, . . . , zN) ∈ C
N+1|z0 = β} and consider the variety W
that is the zero set of (3.10). From Lemmata 4.1− 4.2 and the proof of Theorem 4.3
in [17] it follows that W has constant dimension 1 and that it intersects with Hβ at
a discrete subset of CN+1, that is, for any β ∈ (0, 1)
(3.12) dim(W
⋂
Hβ) = 0.
Now, apply the Buchberger algorithm to find the Gro¨bner basis GB1 of the poly-
nomials
{f1(z0, z), . . . , fN (z0, z)},
with the lexicographic term order z1 ≺ z2 ≺ . . . ≺ zN . The last polynomial g
m(z0, z) ∈
GB1 contains the least number of the variables z1, . . . , zN and has coefficients that
are polynomial functions of z0. It is certainly possible to choose some z0 = β
∗ ∈ (0, 1)
that is not a root of any of these coefficient polynomials. But by (3.12) we have that
Wβ∗ := W
⋂
Hβ∗ is a zero dimensional variety and hence by Corollary 2.2.11 in [5]
the polynomial gm(β∗, z) is univariate in z1. Now, returning to arbitrary z0 in place
of β∗, define g1(z0, z1) := g
m(z0, z), a bivariate polynomial in z0, z1.
Applying Buchberger algorithm again but with the term order z2 ≺ z3 ≺ . . . ≺
zN ≺ z1 will, analogously, yield a new Gro¨bner basis GB2 and a bivariate polynomial
g2(z0, z2). Continuing in this fashion yields the polynomial system (3.11).
Note that if (z0, z) = (z0, z1, . . . , zn) satisfies (3.10), then gs(z0, zs) = 0, for every
s = 1, 2, . . . , N since each gs is part of some Gro¨bner basis of {f1, . . . , fN}. Thus
W ⊂Wd. In particular, since (β,v(β)) ∈ W by Lemma 4.2 and Theorem 4.3 in [17],
it follows that (β,v(β)) ∈Wd and gs(β, vs(β)) = 0, for s = 1, . . . , N .
Furthermore, since each gs is a bivariate polynomial in z0, zs with coefficients
that are algebraic numbers, it becomes a univariate polynomial in zs with algebraic
coefficients, when evaluated at z0 = β that is algebraic. Thus each gs(β, zs) is a
univariate polynomial with algebraic coefficients, hence its roots are also algebraic
numbers, since the field of algebraic numbers is algebraically closed. This completes
the proof.
Corollary 3.2. Consider a discounted stochastic game Γβ with all data lying in
the ordered field of algebraic numbers F. Then there exists a pair of optimal stationary
strategies (µ0, ν0) with all entries lying in F.
Proof. Once we substitute u = v(β) with entries lying in F, the Shapley matrix
games Rβ(s,v(β) also have all entries that lie in F. The statement of the corollary
now follows immediately from the contributions of Weyl [20] and Shapley and Snow
[15], see also Proposition 2.1.
Remark 3.3. It follows from the finiteness of the Buchberger algorithm (and
the fact that there are only |K| kernel selections κ), that the correct set of decoupled
polynomials (3.11) can be found by a finite algorithm. Of course, the latter could
still be of great complexity. Furthermore, the problem of finding the roots of these
polynomials is, in general, not solvable by finite algorithms.
Ordered field property and stochastic games 7
4. Limiting average stochastic games over the ordered field of algebraic
numbers. We now consider a stochastic game where the sequence of single stage
expected rewards {Eµνs(Rt)}
∞
t=0 is aggregated according to
v(µ, ν, s) = lim
τ→∞
inf
(
1
τ + 1
) τ∑
t=0
Eµνs(Rt).
Such a game is called a limiting average (or Cesa`ro average) stochastic game and will
be denoted by Γα. It is still a zero-sum game to which the minimax solution concept
applies. Indeed, the existence of the value vector v = (v1, . . . , vN )
T of Γα was proved
by Mertens and Neymann [6]. These authors showed that
(4.1) v = lim
β→1−
v(β),
where v(β) is the value vector of the discounted game Γβ. They exploited the following
Puiseux series expansion of v(β) that is due to Bewley and Kohlberg [1]
(4.2) v(β) =
∞∑
r=0
cr(s)(1 − β)
r
Ms = c0(s) + δ(s, β),
for each s = 1, 2, . . . , N . Here Ms is a natural number and δ(s, β) → 0 as β → 1.
Clearly, (4.1) and (4.2) imply that the value of the Γα game, starting at state s, is
given by
vs = c0(s), s = 1, 2, . . . , N.
Unfortunately, we cannot immediately conclude from (4.1) that entries of v lie in the
field F when the data of Γα lie in F. This is because a limit of algebraic numbers need
not be algebraic. Hence, we needed to establish the next result.
Theorem 4.1. Consider a limiting average stochastic game Γα with all data
lying in the ordered field of algebraic numbers. Then the value vector v of Γα has
entries vs that are also algebraic numbers, for each s = 1, 2, . . . , N .
Proof. In view of (4.1) and (4.2), it is sufficient to prove that c0(s) is an algebraic
number for each s = 1, 2, . . . , N . Without loss of generality, we supply a proof for the
case of s = 1 only.
The proof will be asymptotic, via a sequence of discounted games Γβk such that
βk → 1
−. In particular, {βk}
∞
k=0 is such that, for each k, there is a selection of
kernels κk ∈ K such, that the polynomials (3.10) define the variety W
k containing
(βk,v(βk)), where v(βk) is the value vector of the game Γβk . However, since |K| <∞
at least one of these kernels, say κˆ, must repeat itself infinitely often. Again, without
loss of generality, we may assume that the entire sequence {βk}
∞
k=0 corresponds to the
same kernel selection κˆ and hence the same variety Wˆ . Now, for the term order z1 ≺
z2 ≺ . . . ≺ zN find the Gro¨bner basis of {f1, . . . , fN}, and the decoupled polynomial
g1(z0, z2), as in the proof of Theorem 3.1. We know that for each k = 0, 1, 2, . . .
(4.3) g1(βk, v1(βk)) = 0.
Hence g1(βk, z1) can be factored as
(4.4) g1(βk, z1) = (z1 − v1(βk))q1(βk, z1),
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where q1(βk, z1) can be obtained by the long division of g1(βk, z1) by the linear factor
(z1− v1(βk)). In case v1(βk) is a root of multiplicity t > 1, the factor (z1− v1(βk))
t−1
would be included in a factorization of g1(βk, z1)) into its irreducible factors. Substi-
tuting (4.2) into (4.4) we obtain for each k = 0, 1, . . .
(4.5) g1(βk, z1) = (z1 − c0(1))q1(βk, z1)− δ(1, βk)q1(βk, z1),
where q1(z0, z1) is a bivariate polynomial in z0, z1 that has coefficients that are alge-
braic numbers.
Next, with z0 = β, we can rewrite the latter polynomial as q1(β, z1) = (1 −
β)ℓq¯1(β, z1), where q¯1(β, z1) does not have a root at β = 1. Hence, since βk → 1, we
have that q¯1(βk, z1)→ q¯1(1, z1) = q
∗
1(z1), where the latter is a univariate polynomial
in z1 that is free of the parameter z0 = β.
Now, consider first, the more generic case of ℓ = 0. Equation (4.5) becomes
(4.6) g1(βk, z1) = (z1 − c0(1))q¯1(βk, z1)− δ(1, βk)q¯1(βk, z1),
for each k = 0, 1, . . . . Passing to the limit with respect to k we obtain
(4.7) lim
k→∞
[g1(βk, z1)] = g1(1, z1) = (z1 − c0(1))q
∗
1(z1),
since limk→∞ [δ(1, βk)q¯1(βk, z1)] = 0 and q
∗
1(z1) 6= 0. But by (4.3) at z1 = v1(βk),
g1(βk, v1(βk)) = 0 for each k, so that the left side of (4.7) is zero. Thus, in the limit
(4.8) 0 = g1(1, z1) = (z1 − c0(1))q
∗
1(z1)
and hence c0(1) = v1 is an algebraic number.
To complete the proof, we next consider the case where ℓ is a positive integer. In
this case we have
(4.9) g1(βk, z1) = (z1 − v1(βk))q1(βk, z1) = (z1 − v1(βk))(1− βk)
ℓq¯1(βk, z1),
for each k = 0, 1, . . .. Set g¯1(β, z1) := (z1 − v1(β))q¯1(β, z1), which is a bivariate
polynomial in (β, z1) with coefficients that are algebraic numbers. By continuity of
polynomials, its limit g¯1(1, z1) as β → 1 is a polynomial in z1 with coefficients that
are algebraic numbers. But, clearly, we still have that 0 = g¯1(βk, v1(βk)), for each
k = 0, 1, . . ., hence in the limit 0 = g¯1(1, v1) = g¯1(1, c0(1)) by (4.1) and (4.2). Hence,
c0(1) is a root of a polynomial with algebraic coefficients and is, therefore, an algebraic
number.
5. Conclusions and examples. As hinted in the introduction, we suggest that
Theorems 4.1 and 5.1 provide a rather comprehensive characterization to the ordered
field property problem posed in [11]. This is because the field F of algebraic numbers
is still a countable ordered field that includes rationals Q and it is unlikely that any
smaller extension of rationals would suffice. We have demonstrated that the Gro¨bner
basis methods, in principle, allow us to identify exactly polynomials (with integer
coefficients) whose roots contain the values of stochastic games Γβ , for s = 1, . . . , N .
However, in general, these roots cannot be computed exactly in terms of radicals.
This is illustrated in Example 2, below, where our decoupled polynomials gs(β, zs)
are quintic. Hence by the classical Abel-Ruffini theorem (e.g., see Theorem 75 and
the following remark in [13], page 75), no radical solutions exist for these polynomials.
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Let us now comment briefly on the structured classes of stochastic games that
are known to possess the ordered field property, over the field Q of rational numbers.
These classes include stochastic games of perfect information originally introduced
by Gillette in 1957 [3], separable reward and state independent transition (SER-SIT)
games [16], [10], single-controller games [9], switching-controller games [2] and addi-
tive reward and additive transition (ARAT) games [12]. For the sake of completeness,
we briefly introduce these classes of games and supply an example of one of them
which exposes their simple algebraic structure in the context of Theorem 4.1.
A single controller stochastic game is a game in which the transition probabilities
satisfy the following:
p(s′|s, a, b1) = p(s
′|s, a, b2) ∀ s, s
′ ∈ S & ∀a ∈ A(s), b1, b2 ∈ B(s).
A switching controller stochastic game is a generalization of the above for which the
state space S can be partitioned into disjoint subsets S1 and S2 such that ∀ s′ ∈ S:
p(s′|s, a, b1) = p(s
′|s, a, b2) ∀ s ∈ S
1 & ∀ a ∈ A(s), b1, b2 ∈ B(s),
p(s′|s, a1, b) = p(s
′|s, a2, b) ∀ s ∈ S
2 & ∀ a1, a2 ∈ A(s), b ∈ B(s).
Incidentally, the perfect information game is equivalent to a switching controller game
in which one of the players has only a single action in each state.
The ARAT stochastic game is one in which both the rewards and the transitions
can be written as the sum of a term determined by player one and a term determined
by player two. That is:
r(s, a, b) = r1(s, a) + r2(s, b) ∀ s ∈ S & ∀ a ∈ A(s), b ∈ B(s),
p(s′|s, a, b) = p1(s
′|s, a) + p2(s
′|s, b) ∀ s, s′ ∈ S & ∀ a ∈ A(s), b ∈ B(s).
Finally, the SER-SIT stochastic game is one for which the rewards and transition
probabilities have the following structure for some scalars c(1), c(2), . . . , c(N):
r(s, a, b) = c(s) + r(a, b) ∀ s ∈ S & ∀ a ∈ A(s), b ∈ B(s)
p(s′|s1, a, b) = p(s
′|s2, a, b) ∀ s
′, s1, s2 ∈ S & ∀ a ∈ A(s) b ∈ B(s).
Next, we illustrate our approach with two simple examples: the first is a switching
controller game and the second is a reward-diagonal game that does not belong to
any of the above structured classes.
Example 1: We consider the switching controller stochastic game as illustrated
in Figure 5.1. Its state space S = S1
⋃
S2 = {1}
⋃
{2}. Each player has three actions
in each state, that is, A(1) = A(2) = {a1, a2, a3} and B(1) = B(2) = {b1, b2, b3}.
For example, in Figure(5.1a) if players one and two choose the first column and row,
respectively, the immediate reward will be −2 for player one and consequently +2 for
player two. Furthermore, at the next stage the game stays in state 1 with probability
3
10 and moves to state 2 with probability
7
10 .
We solved this game in MAPLE symbolic computing environment. In particular,
postponing the normalization by the factor (1−β), Shapley’s auxiliary matrix games
were evaluated and equations (3.5) were manipulated to arrive at the system of two
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polynomial equations of the form (3.6). The latter are (with z0 = β):
f1(β, z1, z2) =32− 12z1 +
22
5
βz1 +
38
5
βz2
f2(β, z1, z2) =9z2 −
81
20
βz1 −
99
20
βz2.
−2
( 310 ,
7
10 )
4
( 310 ,
7
10 )
6
( 310 ,
7
10 )
6
(0, 1)
2
(0, 1)
0
(0, 1)
4
(45 ,
1
5 )
2
(45 ,
1
5 )
2
(45 ,
1
5 )
(a) State One
1
(35 ,
2
5 )
0
(12 ,
1
2 )
−1
(14 ,
3
4 )
−1
(35 ,
2
5 )
1
(12 ,
1
2 )
0
(14 ,
3
4 )
0
(35 ,
2
5 )
−1
(12 ,
1
2 )
1
(14 ,
3
4 )
(b) State Two
Fig. 5.1: A switching controller stochastic game.
To compute the Gro¨bner bases, we first used the lexicographic term order z1 ≺ z2
and then applied the same process again but with the term order z2 ≺ z1. From the
two Gro¨bner bases GB1, GB2 so obtained, we selected the two bivariate polynomials:
• For z1 ≺ z2:
(5.1) g1(β, z1) = 5β
2z1 + 55βz1 − 88β − 60z1 + 160
• For z2 ≺ z1:
(5.2) g2(β, z2) = 5β
2z2 + 55βz2 + 72β − 60z2.
It is not a coincidence, that the latter are linear functions in z1 and z2, respectively.
Evidently, this is a common feature for all the five structured classes of stochastic
games listed above. The zeroes of the above polynomials occur when
z1 =
8
5
11β − 20
(β + 12)(β − 1)
,(5.3)
z2 =−
72
5
β
(β + 12)(β − 1)
.(5.4)
which are clearly positive for β ∈ [0, 1). They are also rational for rational β and
algebraic for algebraic β. Now, for β ∈ (0, 1) the entries of the value vector vβ of Γβ
are obtained by normalization by the factor (1 − β), namely
v1(β) = (1− β)z1 =
160− 88β
5(β + 12)
,(5.5)
v2(β) = (1− β)z2 =
72β
5(β + 12)
.(5.6)
Example 2: The next example is related to the same approach for a reward-
diagonal stochastic game with data as given in Figure 5.2. By following the same
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18
(0, 1)
0
(15 ,
4
5 )
0
(1, 0)
0
(25 ,
3
5 )
12
(13 ,
2
3 )
0
(35 ,
2
5 )
0
(35 ,
2
5 )
0
(25 ,
3
5 )
6
(0, 1)
(a) State One
3
(15 ,
4
5 )
0
( 710 ,
3
10 )
0
( 310 ,
7
10 )
0
(12 ,
1
2 )
2
(25 ,
3
5 )
0
(25 ,
3
5 )
0
( 310 ,
7
10 )
0
(15 ,
4
5 )
1
(0, 1)
(b) State Two
Fig. 5.2: A reward-diagonal stochastic game.
method as in previous example we derived Shapley’s polynomials (3.6). The latter
are (with z0 = β):
f1(β, z1, z2) =−
2
75
β2z31 +
4
75
β2z21z2 −
89
5
βz21 −
2
75
z1β
2z22 +
89
5
z1βz2 + 396z1 +
1
375
β3z21z2 + 9β
2z21
−
11
375
β3z1z
2
2 −
1
5
β2z1z2 − 144βz1 +
7
375
β3z32 −
44
5
β2z22 − 252βz2 − 1296 +
1
125
β3z31
f2(β, z1, z2) =−
6
25
z1β
2z22 − 2z1βz2 +
3
25
β2z32 + 2βz
2
2 + 11z2 +
3
25
β2z21z2 +
33
500
β3z21z2 +
69
100
β2z21
+
27
500
β3z1z
2
2 +
31
50
β2z1z2 −
8
5
βz1 −
31
500
β3z31 −
29
500
β3z32 −
131
100
β2z22 −
47
5
βz2 − 6.
To compute the Gro¨bner bases, we first used the lexicographic term order z1 ≺ z2 and
then applied the same process again but with the term order z2 ≺ z1. From the two
Gro¨bner bases GB1, GB2 so obtained, we selected the two bivariate polynomials:
• For z1 ≺ z2:
g1(β, z1) =
(
573788072β8− 220687720β7− 7503382480β6+ 20744645680β5
−23613586040β4+ 12667475128β3− 2648252640β2
)
z51 +
(
17339824845β7
+777484096540β6− 5051043271810β5+ 12082535624940β4
−13976285582035β3+ 7917677944720β2− 1767708637200β
)
z41
+
(
−132203187917β6− 4061892203389β5+ 41976312974469β4
−139562105527903β3+ 209430408589540β2− 146977072348800β
+39326551704000)z31 +
(
4540064732898β5− 32189023528776β4
+111423218218458β3− 210428562654180β2+ 192643241103600β
−65988937872000)z21 +
(
−36494410557024β4+ 197044804007424β3
−329307266563200β2+ 153965516032800β+ 14791357080000
)
z1
+ 89067118187808β3− 570684050648640β2+ 1146714437289600β
− 720144590112000.
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• For z2 ≺ z1:
g2(β, z2) =
(
573788072β8− 220687720β7− 7503382480β6+ 20744645680β5− 23613586040β4
+12667475128β3− 2648252640β2
)
z52 +
(
−204848895β7− 858363627960β6
+ 3391365456790β5− 4977728569660β4+ 3171701981265β3− 682632847540β2
−44137544000β)z42 +
(
−428935189842β6− 27966474140289β5+ 100992652545319β4
−130647004403803β3+ 72083867190015β2− 13791349509400β− 242756492000
)
z32
+
(
−11840380819272β5− 294095993630166β4+ 1011540632651148β3
−1175534529822210β2+ 552033040308000β− 82102768687500
)
z22
+
(
−150578129579184β4− 965930452772256β3+ 3604616402786640β2
−3768621176239200β+ 1280513355804000)z2 − 737655098899392β
3
+ 906896369212560β2+ 449706809325600β− 673995164922000.
For this case, the polynomials turn out to be quintic. As mentioned earlier, no radical
solutions exist due to Abel-Ruffini’s theorem. In order to find approximate real roots
of these polynomials, we need to specify β. For instance, by setting β = 12 the above
polynomials simplify to:
g1(
1
2
, z1) =−
5359807932115
128
z41 −
733786669
32
z51 +
207671951406997
64
z31
+ 31796998296714z1− 278324994355884−
163463882465331
16
z21
g2(
1
2
, z2) =−
733786669
32
z52 +
61773492718827
8
z22 −
1895121071975
128
z42
+ 167204428685829z2− 314624555318484−
33907289629
2
z32 .
Approximating their real roots in MAPLE we obtain:
z1 = −1900.653702, 4.969443147, 71.41363761
and
z2 = −643.7311436, 1.742768501, 28.64701004.
Note that the unique solution of the stochastic game Γ 1
2
is obtained only with the
help of one particular pair of the above real roots. Indeed, it follows that
v1(
1
2
) = (1−
1
2
)z1 =
1
2
4.969443147 = 2.484721573(5.7)
v2(
1
2
) = (1−
1
2
)z2 =
1
2
1.742768501 = 0.67138250.(5.8)
Formal verification that the above are indeed values of Γ 1
2
, involves substituting these
into Shapley’s auxilliary matrix games and finding their values.
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